Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reliability theory, philosophy: reliability theory is a theory about the occurrence of knowledge. It attempts to explain how subjects in some cases have knowledge, without being able to explain this knowledge for themselves and others. See also causal theory of knowledge, knowledge, regularity, unconscious._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Alvin Goldman on Reliability Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Field II 380 Circumstances/reliability/relativization/Goldman/Fiel: (Goldman, 1980): one should not relativize to circumstances within a possible world when it comes to reliability: otherwise there would be no obstacle to narrowing the relativity to a single instance. Then the rule would be in every single application reliable and thus also reasonable. >Circumstances, >Relativity, >Objectivity, >Certainty, >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge. Goldman: even the relativization to complete possible worlds is still too narrow, we must take classes of similar possible worlds as a basis. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Similarity metric._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gold I Alvin I. Goldman Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Goldman
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27